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Vast numbers of civil litigants in South Africa go unrepresented and unadvised during
proceedings which affect their most significant interests. Section 34 of the Constitution
guarantees a fair civil trial. While s 35, which entrenches the right to a fair criminal
trial, expressly confers a right to legal representation in criminal matters, at least in
some cases, s 34 is silent on what a `fair' civil trial requires. This article considers the
scope of the right to a fair trial in civil matters, sketches the history of diverse attempts
to provide civil legal aid to the poor and analyses the effectiveness of the different
approaches. Against a background of glaring statistics about the cost and availability
of free representation, and on numbers of law students, recent graduates and
practising attorneys, it considers the feasibility of compulsory programmes for the
provision of civil legal aid by the state and the private sector.
I INTRODUCTION
The 1996 Constitution envisages massive changes to South Africa's socio-
economic landscape, specifically aiming to achieve substantive equality
by bringing the law to bear on apartheid's iniquitous legacies. In this
article I tackle the issue of civil legal aid in South Africa, which is
potentially the key instrument for achieving the change envisaged in the
Bill of Rights, but has for too long been neglected both as an academic
subject and as a political objective.
I will consider the relevant constitutional provisions, and ask what
guarantees of legal aid the Constitution provides. I will trace the
historical attempts by state and non-governmental actors to provide legal
aid, leading up to the current position. I question the continuing
emphatic prioritisation of criminal legal aid over civil, particularly in the
state sector. At present, there is a group that falls outside the available
civil legal aid resources but cannot afford private legal assistance. In
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order to serve this broad group, which is largely the working poor, lower
middle class and parts of the rural population, significant policy reform is
necessary. As the state's resources are stretched, the private sector and
the legal profession could provide the human resources necessary:
admitted attorneys, law students and graduates. Finally, I will consider
the possibility of compulsory programmes for the provision of legal aid
by these groups.
II CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT
The simple reality of South African society today is that the majority of
the population lives in conditions of stark poverty. For any of the
constitutional promises to bear fruit, access to civil justice is a simple
prerequisite. This involves creating conditions for genuine legal equality
in the procedural and administrative aspects of the legal system. Such
legal equality has intrinsic value, as it reflects the notion of the equal
dignity of persons. Part of the means to achieve this end (legal equality
and fairness) is the provision of legal aid. However, as Allen argues, the
protection of civil liberties, including securing `fair' civil hearings, should
not be the only goal of legal aid. It should also be understood as a way to
enforce substantive equality rights and promote constitutional guaran-
tees.1
Legal aid, therefore, has an important role to play in facilitating the
enforcement of substantive constitutional rights. This is well illustrated
by the facts of a recent case decided by the Constitutional Court, Jaftha
v Schoeman.2 The two applicants were unemployed women, with few
assets, living in Prince Albert. Both faced the threat of losing their homes
in sales in execution for trifling debts. The litigation was instituted by the
only firm of attorneys in Prince Albert, so that, even if the applicants
could have afforded representation, none was available locally. No legal
aid facilities were available to them. However, the intervention of an
attorney, acting pro bono, enabled them to avoid losing their homes and
culminated in a successful constitutional challenge to the relevant
provision of the Magistrates' Courts Act 32 of 1994.
Kuppan defines legal aid as not only legal representation but also legal
advice, legal education and training.3 However, the predominant need is
for access to free legal representation because without the ability to resort
to litigation, legal knowledge alone is not always sufficient to vindicate
one's rights. When unrepresented vulnerable persons face legal proceed-
ings, as in Jaftha, pro bono representation is often the last hope.
1 J Allen `Focusing Legal Aid on Criminal Defence Marginalizes Women's Legal Service Needs'
(1995) 11 SAJHR 143, 149.
2 2005 (2) SA 140 (CC).
3 G Kuppan `Legal Aid' in MP Olivier et al (eds) The Extension of Social Security Protection in
South Africa: A Legal Inquiry (2001) 131, 133.
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Our constitutional `foreparents' did not overlook this need. The
Constitution guarantees the provision of legal representation at state
expense in criminal matters where substantial injustice would otherwise
result.4 This is a generous guarantee, which the state has attempted, in
good faith, to secure.5 It goes beyond the scope of this article to consider
the extent to which the state has in fact succeeded in providing criminal
legal aid. It is worth noting, however, that the notion of a `fair' criminal
trial includes the provision of free legal representation where `substantial
injustice would otherwise result'.
By contrast, in civil matters, s 34 provides that:
Everyone has the right to have any dispute that can be resolved by the application of law
decided in a fair public hearing before a court or, where appropriate, another
independent and impartial tribunal or forum.
According to McQuoid-Mason, s 34 does not impose a duty on the state
to provide legal aid in a civil suit to those who cannot afford it.6 This
interpretation is supported by the wording of the section, which
guarantees merely a `fair trial', read in comparison with the express
guarantee in s 35(3)(g) of legal representation for accused persons.
However, `fairness' in adversarial legal proceedings requires more than
`Diceyan' formal legal equality.7 The notion of formal or procedural legal
equality is `a passive and formal approach in which legal equality is
regarded as being satisfied if individuals and institutions are treated as
though they are equals, regardless of the profound inequalities within
their actual relationships'.8
In the context of civil litigation, this notion of procedural legal equality
presupposes two things: firstly, that people with a cause of action or a
legal defence are aware of their rights; and secondly, that such people are
able to bring their case to court and present it competently. In the
majority of cases in South Africa, these presuppositions do not hold.
Social, financial, cultural as well as language barriers prevent many from
asserting their rights.9 Sarkin notes that the flaw in the adversarial system
is the premise that justice will be served as both parties have the ability to
influence the judge equally.10
4 Section 35(3)(g).
5 The Legal Aid Board provided indigent accused with legal aid in 246 231 cases in the years
2001-02 and 2002-03 taken together. See the Legal Aid Board Annual Report 2002/3, 14 Figure
7.
6 D McQuoid-Mason `The Delivery of Civil Legal Aid Services in South Africa' (2000) 24
Fordham Int LJ S-111, S-112.
7 A Lester `Legal Aid in a Democratic Society' in Faculty of Law, University of Natal Legal Aid
in South Africa (1974) 1-17, 1.
8 Ibid.
9 Kuppan (note 3 above) 133.
10 J Sarkin `Restructuring the Legal Profession and Access to Justice: The Duty of Law
Graduates and Lawyers to Provide Legal Services' (1993) 9 SAJHR 223, 226.
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Chief Justice Pius Langa expressed this simple truth: `As far as
litigation is concerned, there can be no equality [or fairness] where the
combatants do not enjoy equality of arms.'11 Substantive fairness can
never be secured without `equality of arms', which effectively means
adequate legal advice and representation.12 If the state and legal
profession fail to provide legal aid for the entire population of South
Africa, the guarantee of a `fair' public hearing rings hollow.
Traditionally, criminal legal aid has been prioritised over civil.13 This
should be questioned for a number of reasons.14 First, statistical evidence
indicates that the main beneficiaries of criminal legal aid are men, while
mainly women seek civil legal aid.15 Relatively few women are charged
with criminal offences, and their need for legal services is predominantly
in the civil arena, particularly in divorce cases.16 In the South African
context, in 1992-93, divorces made up 19 per cent of the Legal Aid
Board's caseload, the next largest category after criminal matters.17
However, the Board now rarely provides assistance in divorce cases.
Prioritising criminal legal aid over civil may amount, prima facie, to
indirect discrimination on the basis of gender. However, particularly
given the explicit constitutional obligation in respect of criminal legal aid
in s 35, such discrimination may not be unfair in terms of s 9(3).
A second objection to prioritising criminal legal aid is that a greater
proportion of the population requires civil than criminal representa-
tion.18 The traditional justification for this prioritisation is that criminal
matters potentially have more serious consequences, particularly the
deprivation of liberty,19 and also that there is an imbalance of resources
and expertise between the prosecution and an unrepresented accused. The
Canadian National Council of Welfare Report on Legal Aid counters this
argument with examples of civil matters involving the removal of a child
from a home in child protection cases, the involuntary commitment of
psychiatric patients and the deportation of refugees.20 Another good
example of civil matters with far-reaching consequences, particularly in
the South African context, is found in litigation concerning socio-
economic rights, such as the constitutional rights to housing, water, food,
11 B Whittle `Pro Bono Appealing to the Profession's Social Conscience' De Rebus (June 2002)
13.
12 See Bernstein v Bester 1996 (2) SA 751 (CC) note 154.
13 In the years 2001-02 and 2002-03 taken together, the Legal Aid Board provided legal aid in
246 231 criminal matters, but only 18 534 civil matters. See the Legal Aid Board Annual
Report 2002/3, 14 Figure 7.
14 Canadian National Council of Welfare Report on Legal Aid (1995) 10.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
17 Allen (note 1 above) 145.
18 Canadian National Council of Welfare (note 14 above) 10.
19 Allen (note 1 above) 143.
20 Note 14 above 10.
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health care services and social security.21 These examples demonstrate
that a civil case can affect an individual's most fundamental interests as
significantly as a criminal case.
In response to the argument that criminal proceedings involve the use
of disproportionate state power to punish individuals, Budlender notes
that the state's coercive powers are also at play in civil proceedings, as
they are used to adjudicate and enforce claims under law made by the
state.22
In the recent case of Nkuzi Development Association v Government of
South Africa, the Land Claims Court held that the Constitution does
confer a right to legal representation at state expense in civil suits, at least
in respect of land tenants in the circumstances of that case.23 The Court,
in a judgment delivered by Moloto AJ, held that there is no logical basis
for distinguishing between criminal and civil matters, as civil matters are
equally complex.24 The Court held that persons who have a right to
security of tenure under the Extension of Security of Tenure Act,25 whose
security of tenure is threatened or infringed, have a right to legal
representation or legal aid at state expense if substantial injustice would
otherwise result, and if they cannot afford the cost of representation.26
The Court held that substantial injustice would result where the potential
consequences of the matter are severe and the person concerned is not
likely to be able to present his or her case effectively without
representation.27
The Court in Nkuzi grounded the right to representation at state
expense in the property right, specifically in s 25(6) of the Constitution,
which guarantees legally secure tenure `or comparable redress'.28 The
Land Claims Court seemed to assume a right to representation where
`substantial injustice' would otherwise result. The criterion of `substantial
injustice', which is contained in s 35 of the Constitution, is, however,
applicable only to criminal trials. Therefore, while the outcome of Nkuzi
is laudable, the decision does not have a sound constitutional basis, either
in terms of where the court located the right to representation in the
Constitution or in terms of the standard for determining when civil legal
aid ought to be given.
To argue for a right to civil legal aid it is necessary to rely on the right
to a fair civil hearing in s 34, except in the case of children, to whom s 28
applies, as discussed further below. While the Nkuzi decision may be
21 See, for example, Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC)
(right to housing in terms of s 26 of the Constitution).
22 G Budlender `Access to Courts' (2004) 121 SALJ 339, 351.
23 2002 (2) SA 733 (LCC).
24 Ibid 737.
25 Act 62 of 1997.
26 Note 23 above.
27 Ibid order 1.3.
28 Ibid 734.
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correct in holding that there is no principled reason to distinguish
between civil and criminal matters in relation to the importance of legal
representation, the textual distinction in the Constitution cannot be
ignored. Section 35 of the Constitution refers explicitly to legal
representation as an aspect of a fair criminal trial where `substantial
injustice' would otherwise result, but s 34 makes no such guarantee in
relation to a fair civil hearing. In Legal Aid Board v Msila, the court
endorsed the principle, originally laid down in Legal Aid Board
guidelines and adopted by the courts, that the substantial injustice test
is satisfied where the applicant for legal aid is criminally charged and
faces the danger of imprisonment without the option of a fine.29 This test
clearly cannot apply to civil matters.
This does not mean, however, that the concepts of fairness in criminal
and civil trials might not overlap. Fairness in s 34 might, therefore,
include legal representation, which is specifically listed in s 35 as part of a
fair criminal trial, in the latter provision triggered by the `substantial
injustice' criterion. The Constitutional Court has held that the right to a
fair criminal trial is not limited to the specific rights listed in s 35.30
Proceeding by analogy, the fact that legal representation is listed as an
element of a fair criminal trial but is not expressly mentioned as an aspect
of the right to a fair civil hearing does not preclude the courts from
interpreting s 34 to include such a right.31 This must, however, be done
on the basis of the wording of s 34, and one cannot simply import the s 35
criterion of `substantial injustice'.
Rather, it is necessary to consider what `fairness' requires in the
circumstances of each case. Fairness in the civil context requires
consideration of factors different from those that apply in determining
whether `substantial injustice' will result in the criminal context. These
factors can be gleaned from case law.
Budlender demonstrates that provisions similar to s 34 have been
interpreted to include a right to representation in some civil suits in
international and foreign law.32 South African courts interpreting the
Constitution are obliged to consider international law and permitted to
consider foreign law, in terms of s 39 of the Constitution. Under
international law, criminal legal aid is prioritised, with the major
international instruments mirroring the Constitution in guaranteeing
free legal representation in criminal cases and merely a procedurally `fair'
trial in civil matters.33 Nevertheless, the European Court of Human
29 1997 (2) BCLR 229 (E), 236.
30 S v Zuma 1995 (2) SA 642 (CC) para 16.
31 Budlender (note 22 above) 342.
32 Ibid 340-345.
33 See, for example, art 14(1) and art 14(3)(d) International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (1966); art 6(1) and art 6(3) European Convention on Human Rights (1950); art 7 and
art 8(2)(e) American Convention on Human Rights (1969); art 26 African Charter on Human
and People's Rights (1981).
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Rights has interpreted art 6 of the European Convention on Human
Rights to include a right to representation in some civil cases.34 Article
6(1) refers to a `fair and public hearing', while s 34 of the Constitution
guarantees a `fair public hearing'.
In Airey v Ireland, the European Court held that the Irish government's
failure to provide Mrs Airey with free representation for the purpose of
securing a judicial separation violated her right of access to court in Art
6(1).35 Research presented as evidence could not provide a single instance
in which a decree of judicial separation had been obtained in Ireland
without legal representation.36 The effect of Airey is that a fair civil
hearing may, in certain circumstances, require the provision of legal
representation at state expense. Article 6 of the European Convention is
almost identical to s 34 of the Constitution. This provides strong grounds
for interpreting s 34 to impose a similar duty on government in
circumstances where a litigant is unlikely to be able to obtain relief
without representation. However, Airey held that Art 6(1) does not
guarantee a right to free civil legal aid, but merely obliges state parties to
take steps to ensure the progressive realisation of such a right.37
The Canadian Supreme Court confronted the question of a right to
free representation in civil suits in the context of s 7 of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms in the case of G (J).38 Section 7 reads:
`Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the
right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles
of fundamental justice.'39
The Court held that the combination of stigmatisation, loss of privacy
and disruption of family life that might result from a custody suit are
sufficient to constitute a restriction of security of the person.40 In
deciding whether `fundamental justice' necessitated the provision of legal
representation in a particular case, the Court referred to `the best
interests of the child' as the paramount consideration.41 Provided these
are not compromised, a court should then consider the interests at stake,
the complexity of proceedings and the capacities of the parent.42 In the
circumstances of the case, the Supreme Court held that the government
was under an obligation to provide the appellant with state-funded
counsel.43 It is worth noting that s 7 of the Canadian Charter, dealing
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35 Ibid para 28.
36 Ibid para 24.
37 Ibid para 26.
38 New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services) v G (J) 66 CRR (2nd) 267
(1999).
39 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 1982.




with threats to `life, liberty and security of the person', is significantly
narrower than s 34, which encompasses all civil matters.
The position under the South African Constitution is slightly different,
because s 28 deals specifically with legal representation in matters
affecting children. Under the South African Constitution, the Canadian
case of G (J) might have been considered an appropriate case for the
appointment of a legal representative to act for the child concerned. In
the case of children's rights in civil suits, which are distinct from the right
of all persons under s 34, s 28(1)(h) guarantees a child's right to `have a
legal practitioner assigned to the child by the state, and at state expense,
in civil proceedings affecting the child, if substantial injustice would
otherwise result'.
Section 28, therefore, expressly guarantees legal representation for
children.44 The right appears not to be limited by the state's resource
constraints, but is confined to cases where `substantial injustice' would
result if representation at state expense were not provided. The provision
is applicable not only to matters in which a child is a party to a civil suit,
but in any matter `affecting' the child, which would include adoption,
custody, maintenance and possibly even divorce matters. In such matters,
the representative would be `assigned to the child', and directly represent
him or her. The role of such a s 28 legal representative was usefully
discussed in Soller NO v G,45 where Satchwell J explained:
The legal practitioner stands squarely in the corner of the child and has the task of
presenting and arguing the wishes and desires of that child. . . . The legal practitioner
does not only represent the perspective of the child concerned. The legal practitioner
should also provide adult insight into those wishes and desires which have been confided
and entrusted to him or her as well as apply legal knowledge and expertise to the child's
perspective.46
In Christian Education SA v Minister of Education, Liebenberg J held
that s 28 makes it clear that the state is responsible for the expenses of a
legal representative appointed in terms of s 28(1)(h).47 However, this does
not cater for the interests of parents, and their claim to state-funded legal
aid would fall under s 34, as s 28 is concerned with the child's right to
legal representation.
To sum up, the state's constitutional obligations to provide legal aid
are differentiated in respect of criminal and civil matters, and special
provision is made for matters affecting children. The Constitution
contains an express guarantee of free legal representation in all criminal
matters and all civil matters affecting children `where substantial injustice
44 For a more comprehensive discussion of the child's right to be heard, see J Gallinetti `Article
12 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and Implementing the Child's Right to be
Heard' (unpublished LLM Minor Dissertation, University of Cape Town 2001).
45 2003 (5) SA 430 (W).
46 Ibid para 27.
47 1999 (4) SA 1092 (SE), 1097.
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would otherwise result'. This creates a positive right to legal representa-
tion, which is, in principle, justiciable.
In other civil matters, s 34 makes no such guarantee. A similarly
worded guarantee of a `fair hearing' in Art 6 of the European Convention
on Human Rights was interpreted in Airey to require free legal
representation in certain circumstances. However, a major difference
between Art 6 and s 34 is that the former applies to both civil and
criminal matters. Therefore, the fact that the Constitution expressly
guarantees free legal representation only in criminal matters and matters
affecting children must carry some weight, although legal representation
must still form part of the concept of `fairness' in s 34. The criterion of
`substantial injustice' cannot simply be imported into the interpretation
of s 34. Rather, factors such as those discussed in the cases of Nkuzi,
Airey and G (J) must be used to determine when a failure by the state to
provide civil legal aid will render a hearing unfair in terms of s 34. These
include the interests of the litigant that are at stake, the complexity of the
proceedings and the capacity of the litigant to represent herself.
Where evidence can be adduced to show that a particular type of
litigation is unlikely to succeed without representation, as in Airey, the
lack of free legal representation is more likely to render a civil hearing
unfair.48 This was successfully done in the Nkuzi case, where the Legal
Resources Centre conducted research into evictions of farm-dwellers.49
However, even where such research can be presented as evidence, it is not
clear that the courts will interpret s 34 to confer a right to civil legal aid
on demand. At least, courts will also have to consider the capacity of the
litigant to represent him or herself, and the complexity and potential
consequences of the litigation. These factors would have to be weighed
together to determine whether a failure to provide representation would
render a civil trial unfair. This would not be the case in all civil matters
and for all civil litigants. Relatively well-educated civil litigants engaging
in fairly straightforward civil litigation might not be entitled to free
representation.
On this analysis of s 34, the state is under a duty to implement a
comprehensive programme for the provision of free civil legal aid to those
who cannot afford it where, in the circumstances of each case, the failure
to do so would render the civil trial unfair. However, resource constraints
prevent the state from doing so alone. Given that the Legal Aid Act 22 of
1969 is a `law of general application' in terms of the limitations clause in
s 36 of the Constitution, the state's obligations to provide legal aid in civil
matters are difficult to determine.50 A limitations analysis goes beyond
the scope of this article, but a few observations can be made. As a starting
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49 Ibid.
50 See the discussion in Budlender (note 22 above) 347-356.
point, the state's obligations are unlikely to cover legal aid in all civil
litigation, whether the rights of civil litigants are limited by narrowly
construing the scope of the right (fair) in s 34, or by means of a s 36
limitation. I agree with Ellmann that costs and resource constraints are
likely to play a greater role in limiting the state's obligations in the
context of civil legal aid under s 34 than in respect of criminal legal aid
under s 35.51 Budlender, noting certain conceptual difficulties with
allowing resource constraints to justify a limitation under s 36, suggests
that this factor should be considered in deciding on remedy.52
Whatever the theoretical route taken, sweeping judicial intervention to
overhaul the entire state legal aid system is highly unlikely.53 However, an
order declaring a breach of the state's obligations, but suspended to allow
time for government to develop a programmatic response to the lacuna in
respect of civil legal aid might be the most appropriate judicial
response.54 This would simply act to prompt a policy response from
the state.
One possible policy approach, with the advantage of mitigating the
expense to the state of providing free legal aid, is to implement a
programme of compulsory pro bono work for practising lawyers, law
students or graduates. Even if the state is considered to bear the primary
obligation to deliver civil legal aid under s 34, the legal profession
arguably shares this responsibility, as the custodian of the system of
justice.55 Arguably, therefore, the state might be entitled to look to the
organised profession to assist in discharging its constitutional obliga-
tions, and to go beyond the state's obligations to provide civil legal aid in
cases where the state is not bound to do so. As will be discussed below,
the ideal situation is for representative bodies of the legal profession to
undertake a self-imposed compulsory system as a matter of professional
constitutional obligation. However, were they unwilling to do so, the
state might impose such obligations by virtue of its power to regulate
professions.
To understand the debate around compulsory pro bono programmes,
it is necessary to contextualise it against the background of the different
programmes adopted in the past in South Africa for the provision of civil
legal aid. Lessons can be learnt from these experiences, which are
important in considering the pro bono option.
51 S Ellmann `Weighing and Implementing the Right to Counsel' (2004) 121 SALJ 318, 328-9.
52 Budlender (note 22 above) 353.
53 Ellmann (note 51 above) 337.
54 Budlender (note 22 above) 357-8.
55 B Cardin and R Rhudy `Symposium: Expanding Pro Bono Legal Assistance in Civil Cases to
Maryland's Poor' (1990) 49 Maryland LR 1, 13.
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III HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The meaning of `access to justice' in the South African context has
changed with time. Under apartheid, it meant `an attempt to expand the
space for activists to work toward the dismantling of the apartheid state
through protest, mass action and through the courts'.56 In the fledgling
constitutional democracy today, `access to justice' must mean shaping the
legal institutional framework to better serve the whole population, and
make good on constitutional promises of genuine social and economic
advancement within the new political climate. The institutions respon-
sible for the provision of legal aid can be divided into state-sponsored
programmes and non-governmental initiatives.
(a) State-sponsored programmes
The state first put in place a programme for the provision of legal aid to
indigent persons in 1962.57 The scheme emerged from negotiations
between the Department of Justice and the organised legal profession.
Attorneys and advocates agreed to provide free legal services to any
person referred to them by a local legal aid committee to be set up at each
magistrates' court. As McQuoid-Mason notes, the system failed for three
main reasons: first, lack of publicity; secondly, the work went unpaid,
resulting in a lack of motivation and poor standards; and lastly, excessive
bureaucracy or `red tape'.58
In 1969, the Legal Aid Board was established in terms of the Legal Aid
Act 22 of 1969. It remains the largest provider of legal aid and is tasked
with discharging the state's obligations to provide legal assistance. In
terms of the Act, the Board must `render or make available legal aid to
indigent persons'.59 It provides assistance in criminal and civil matters,
subject to certain exclusions and a financial `means test'. Until recently,
the Board used state-compensated private attorneys and advocates, the
so-called `judicare' model.60
Under this system, an indigent person could apply to the Board. If
approved, the applicant was referred to a private practitioner of his or her
choice. The practitioner was paid by the Board. There were two main
problems with the system. First, it was relatively expensive: the average
cost of a judicare case in 1998 was R1 423.61 This is considerably more
expensive than a salaried lawyer scheme.62 Secondly, the Board lacked
56 D Bengtsson `Justice for All? Law Clinics in South Africa' (unpublished LLM thesis,
University of Natal 2002, 2).
57 McQuoid-Mason (note 6 above) S-117.
58 Ibid.
59 Section 3 of the Legal Aid Board Act.
60 McQuoid-Mason (note 6 above) S-117.
61 Legal Aid Board Legotla: Overview of the Board and its Activities 8 (Nov 1998), Unpublished
report of the Legal Aid Board, cited in D McQuoid-Mason (note 6 above) S-121.
62 McQuoid-Mason (note 6 above) S-121.
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the administrative infrastructure to run the scheme, so that accounts
often took years to settle and there was little `quality control' in respect of
services dispensed by private practitioners.63
In 1995, a pilot project was established in co-operation with Lawyers
for Human Rights.64 With the agreement of small-town law firms, the
Board assisted with the payment of salaries of candidate attorneys,65 who
were to handle at least ten new cases a month at no cost on behalf of the
Board.66 This initiative is very cost-effective, but is used mostly in
criminal matters.67 It appears ideal for rural areas, where large justice
centres would not be cost-effective, but this pilot project has unfortu-
nately been discontinued.
In 1998, the Board, near bankrupt and with a huge backlog of unpaid
accounts from private practitioners, adopted a new model. Justice centres
were envisaged as `one-stop legal aid shops', to provide comprehensive
legal services through salaried candidate attorneys, attorneys, advocates,
paralegals and administrative staff.68 The services provided include an
initial consultation or screening process, legal advice, non-litigious
dispute resolution methods such as arbitration and mediation, as well
as legal representation. The Board began with the establishment of pilot
urban and rural centres and aimed to establish 57 urban and 14 rural
centres by the end of 2003.69 At the end of 2003, 59 justice centres and 28
satellite offices were functioning.70
Justice centres have three main advantages. First, the average cost of a
case is greatly reduced.71 Secondly, these should provide direct access to
comprehensive legal assistance. Thirdly, the twin risks of over-charging
and under-performing that existed under the judicare model are
potentially eliminated. Although concerns about the quality of service
will remain, it is easier for the Board to evaluate the performance of
justice centres and their staff than that of private practitioners handling
judicare matters.72 The Board has decided to move away from the
judicare model to the justice centre model, and, in 2003/4, managed to
reduce judicare referrals to 16 per cent of its caseload, a figure it hopes to
reduce further each year.73
63 Ibid S-121.
64 Ibid S-122. An earlier pilot project was the Johannesburg public defender office, which was the




68 Ibid S-125 to S-126.
69 Legal Aid Board Business Plan Covering the Period 2000 to 2003 (1999) 20.
70 Legal Aid Board (note 5 above), 14 Figure 4.
71 The average cost of a judicare case was R1 867, while the average cost of a justice centre case is
R803. Ibid 14 Figure 5.
72 The Legal Aid Board has already put in place monitoring and evaluation mechanisms,
including reporting and auditing requirements. See the Legal Aid Board (note 5 above) 12.
73 Ibid 19 Table 5.
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The Board has also entered into co-operative projects with law clinics
at universities. This programme began in 1995 with six universities.74
There are currently twelve co-operation agreements between university
law clinics and the Legal Aid Board, creating formal links between these
clinics and specific justice centres.75 Six university clinics have entered
into such agreements, namely the universities of the North West
(formerly Potchefstroom),76 Venda, Pretoria, Witwatersrand, Free State
and Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University (formerly Port Elizabeth).
These Legal Aid Board clinics are separate, at least in theory, from the
independent university legal aid clinics, which have now been set up at all
21 law schools in the country.77 In practice, the clinics at the six
universities mentioned above simply have internal divisions, some funded
by the Board and some independently funded.78 The Board funds
attorneys and candidate attorneys who render legal services to indigent
persons in criminal and civil matters.79
To receive legal assistance through any of the legal service providers
funded by the Legal Aid Board, an applicant must meet certain criteria.
In terms of the Legal Aid Act, legal aid is only rendered to `indigent'
persons.80 The term is not defined in the Act, but has been defined,
although not in the context of the Act, in the case of Smith v Mutual &
Federal Insurance Co Ltd, distinguishing `indigent' and `poor'.81 The
judge stated that `to be indigent means to be in extreme need or want
whereas to be poor means having few things or nothing'.82
On the basis of the term `indigent', the Board has laid down a financial
means test, which is revised from time to time, but in which the threshold
remains low enough to exclude a large group. At present, the means test
provides that to qualify one must earn less than R1 200 a month if single
or less than R2 000 for a couple with a child.83 To this one can add R180
for each child. Perhaps 50 per cent of our population would qualify.84
However, this excludes a large proportion of the population people who
74 D McQuoid-Mason `Legal Representation and the Courts' in Ronald Louw (ed) SA Human
Rights Yearbook (1995) 148, 155.
75 I am grateful to Mr Schalk Meyer, President of the Association of University Legal Aid
Institutions (AULAI) for supplying me with this information, by email on 2 December 2003.
76 There are seven agreements between North West University and different justice centres in
Mpumalanga, Vaal Triangle and the North West.
77 Kuppan (note 3 above) 140.
78 McQuoid-Mason (note 74 above) 155.
79 Kuppan (note 3 above) 140
80 See the long title of the Legal Aid Act.
81 1998 (4) SA 626 (C), 632.
82 Ibid.
83 See the Legal Aid Board website at < http://www.legal-aid.co.za/services/qualifica-
tions.htm>.
84 Statistics show that in 1999 more than 50 per cent of South African households had a total
income of less than R1 400 per month. This figure comes from the All Media Products Survey
published by the South African Advertising Research Foundation. See the South African
Institute of Race Relations Survey 2000/2001 369 cited in C O'Regan `Producing Competent
Graduates: The Primary Social Responsibility of Law Schools' (2001) 118 SALJ 242, 244.
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earn above this threshold but are still unable to afford private
representation, perhaps as many as 15 per cent or more of the
population.85 As noted by Kuppan, this strict threshold limits the
provision of legal aid to those persons in extreme need or want for the
basic necessities of life.86 It excludes the broad group of the working poor
and middle class.
The provision of legal aid by the Board is also restricted according to
the type of matter for which assistance is sought. Exclusions include
defamation matters, `undeserving' divorce cases, most maintenance
matters and family violence.87 The Board largely prioritises criminal
matters over civil legal aid: 88 per cent of the latest Board budget was
spent on criminal legal aid.88
Another problem is physical access to state legal aid resources in rural
areas, which remains very limited. The few justice centres established in
rural areas concentrate on criminal matters, in line with the Board's
general policy of prioritising criminal legal aid.89 Kuppan notes that
these exclusions and limitations create a `marginalised group' consisting
of the rural populace and the urban working poor and middle class.90
The former are excluded mainly because of a factual lack of services in
rural areas; the latter are shut out by the definition of `indigent'.
(b) Non-governmental initiatives
Non-governmental initiatives take two main forms: independent uni-
versity law clinics and non-governmental organisations (NGOs).
Independent law clinics have been set up at all of South Africa's
twenty-one law schools. Attorneys and candidate attorneys supervise law
students who render legal assistance to indigent and poor people. These
clinics have two main objects: rendering community service and
providing practical legal training for law students.91 The means tests of
these clinics are less strict than that of the Board, allowing a greater
proportion of the working poor to gain access to their services.92 The
university law clinics are represented by the Association of Independent
University Legal Aid Clinics (AULAI).93 Their accessibility is increased
85 See the `General Household Survey 2002' conducted by Statistics South Africa. In the sample
group, approximately 13 per cent of households had a monthly expenditure of between R1 200
and R2 500, while for about 7 per cent this amount was between R2 500 and R5 000. This
survey can be viewed on the Stats SA website: <www.statssa.gov.za>.
86 Kuppan (note 3 above) 136.
87 Legal Aid Guide 2001.
88 Legal Aid Board (note 5 above) 20 Table 7.
89 Kuppan (note 3 above) 150.
90 Ibid 151.
91 See, for example, the Constitution of the University of Cape Town Legal Aid Clinic
(unpublished).
92 Kuppan (note 3 above) 141.
93 McQuoid-Mason (note 6 above) S-129.
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by the fact that some operate outside normal working hours and work
within communities.94 However, their efficacy is limited by resource
constraints that prevent them from giving an across-the-board guarantee
of civil legal aid.95
In addition, several NGOs offer free legal assistance in civil matters.
Most, however, are pilot projects, specialise in a narrow area of law or
target particular sectors of the population. An example of a targeted pilot
project is the Community Law and Rural Development Centre, Durban,
which provides legal education and advice to about a million rural people
living in KwaZulu-Natal and the Eastern Cape.96 Examples of specialist
organisations are the Legal Resources Centre (LRC), Lawyers for
Human Rights (LHR) and the Women's Legal Centre (WLC).97 The
LRC is South Africa's largest public interest law firm and engages in
strategic impact litigation.98 LHR, similarly, has targeted and still targets
human rights issues for litigation,99 such as the death penalty case100 and,
more recently, a high court challenge to the Immigration Act.101 The
WLC aims `to advance women's rights by conducting constitutional
litigation and advocacy on gender issues'.102 An exception to this targeted
approach is the Black Sash, which still provides wide-ranging poverty law
advice and assistance through advice offices located around the
country.103 However, it too has limited resources.
Although these NGOs play a valuable role, that role does not include a
broad guarantee of legal assistance for the vast marginalised group not
covered by the Legal Aid Board. Rather, they predominantly target
specific areas of the law as ripe for strategic impact litigation, and
concentrate on those cases.
IV REFORM: SERVING THE `MARGINALISED GROUP'
Major reform is necessary if the civil legal aid system is adequately to
serve the group that is currently excluded. I will consider two proposals.
Both involve sectors of the mainstream legal community rendering
services, and both involve an element of compulsory participation. I




97 Kuppan (note 3 above) 143.
98 Ibid.
99 See the Lawyers for Human Rights website: <www.lhr.org.za>.
100 S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC). Lawyers for Human Rights was admitted as an
amicus curiae, while the Legal Resources Centre acted for the applicant.
101 Lawyers for Human Rights v Minister of Home Affairs (TPD 21 April 2003, unreported).
102 See the Women's Legal Centre website: <www.wlce.co.za>.
103 See the Black Sash website: <www.blacksash.org.za>.
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to the marginalised group of rural people and the working poor and
lower middle class. Three simple statistics are relevant:
(i) South Africa has a total population of about 45 million, the majority
of whom are impoverished, with a household income that does not
allow them to secure private legal representation;104
(ii) South Africa has approximately 14 000 practising attorneys;105 and
(iii) South Africa has twenty-one law schools, which produce an average
of 2 500 graduates each year.106
On the basis of the above statistics, it is my view that the most effective
reform for the provision of civil legal aid would be a two-pronged
programme comprising compulsory pro bono work by practising
attorneys, and compulsory community service by law students and/or
graduates.
(a) Compulsory pro bono work by attorneys
(i) The Cape Law Society: Mandatory pro bono
At its 2002 Annual General Meeting (AGM), the Law Society of the
Cape of Good Hope passed a motion that will make it mandatory for all
practising attorneys in the Western, Eastern and Northern Cape to do 24
hours of pro bono work each year.107 This came after the Cape Law
Society had approved mandatory pro bono in principle at their AGM of
2001.108 The Cape Law Society will be moving to amend its practice rules
to cater for this new policy.109
The Cape has led the way as the first provincial law society to pass such
a resolution. The services will be rendered in a number of areas of civil
and criminal law, in terms of a list of such services that is intended to
form part of the new rule governing pro bono work.110 These include
various areas of general practice, as well as Small Claims Court work.
The attorneys will render the services through pre-existing `recognised
structures' such as university clinics, NGOs and community advice
offices and through the High Court when the Registrar issues in forma
pauperis instructions.111 The Cape Law Society will enter into a `joint
104 Stats SA National Population Census 2001: the final results reflected a population of 44,8
million See the Stats SA website: <http://www.statssa.gov.za/Specialprojects/Census2001/
Census2001.htm>.
105 O'Regan (note 87 above) 244.
106 Ibid.
107 `Cape Attorneys Opt for Mandatory Pro Bono Work' De Rebus (December 2002).
108 Ibid.
109 A draft rule 21 to be inserted into the Cape Law Society's rules has been circulated among
attorneys for comment.
110 Draft rule 21.4, Cape Law Society Rules.
111 Draft rule 21.1, Cape Law Society Rules.
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venture agreement' with these legal service providers and courts to
facilitate the rendering of pro bono services.112 Each attorney will have to
submit a proposed `area of professional work for recognition as pro bono
services'.113 An example of the type of services that will be rendered is the
supervision of students at `satellite' university legal aid clinics.
(ii) Compulsory pro bono nationally?
The Cape Law Society is thus far the only provincial body to have made
mandatory the rendering of pro bono services. The question was
discussed at the 2002 AGMs of the Law Society of Northern Province
and the Free State Law Society, but no position was taken.114 At the Free
State AGM there was some opposition to the idea of pro bono work
being made mandatory, as it was argued that many attorneys already
provide free assistance voluntarily.115 The Law Society of South Africa
(LSSA) has expressed the view that pro bono work should be
voluntary.116 The then executive director of the LSSA, AndreÂ van
Vuuren, stated at a pro bono conference in May 2002 that the LSSA was
`firmly and irrevocably committed to the concept of pro bono'.117 He
went on, however, to emphasise the difficulties with such a programme,
particularly that small firms struggle to divert scarce resources to pro
bono work.118 He suggested tax reductions or financial incentives to
make pro bono work more attractive.119
The debate over the introduction of pro bono work for attorneys seems
to be approaching a climax. The programme being implemented by the
Cape Law Society is leading the way.
It should be noted that there is also momentum behind pro bono
proposals at the General Council of the Bar and its constituent bar
councils. Obviously, a pro bono programme adopted by advocates would
complement whatever programme the attorneys' profession settles on.
(iii) Advantages of compulsory pro bono for attorneys
The most important advantage of making pro bono for attorneys
compulsory is simply that such a programme will increase the resources
available to those who cannot afford private legal assistance. Using the
relatively modest Cape model of 24 hours per attorney per year, and
112 Draft Joint Venture Agreement, submitted with the Motion by the Council of the Cape Law
Society at the 2002 AGM.
113 Draft rule 21.3, Cape Law Society Rules.
114 See `Cape Attorneys Opt for Mandatory Pro Bono Work' (note 107 above).
115 Ibid.
116 Ibid.
117 Whittle (note 11 above) 14.
118 Ibid.
119 Ibid.
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given that there are almost 14 000 practising attorneys in South Africa, a
national programme would generate approximately 336 000 hours of pro
bono time per year. This would go a long way to improving access to civil
justice in particular, because most of this work would involve civil
matters. This programmatic approach cannot properly be undertaken
other than compulsorily, as voluntarism would contribute neither the
personnel nor the potential to administer systematically that a mandatory
policy would ensure.
Besides administrative costs that would be borne by the Law Society,
the defining feature of pro bono work is that it is free. This is even more
significant given the fact that the Legal Aid Board is only just beginning
to extricate itself from the financial turmoil in which it found itself prior
to the decision to move away from the `judicare' system, which left the
Board with huge debts and an enormous backlog of unpaid claims.120 In
2002, the Board reported its first saving in ten years in its financial
results.121 A pro bono programme avoids the risk of the Board again
running up huge debts owed to practising lawyers.
Another advantage is the prospect of creating an ethos of public
service.122 A pro bono programme should have the result that attorneys
will begin to view the facilitation of access to legal services by the poor as
a responsibility shared by the state and the legal profession. This would
also improve the public image of the profession.
The programme would also give recognition to pro bono work. Willem
de Klerk, a Johannesburg attorney who is the former head of the
University of Witwatersrand's Clinic, suggests that recognition can be
provided through media coverage and awards.123 Even without such
additional steps, simply institutionalising pro bono work will afford a
measure of recognition that has not been given to the many attorneys
who have been giving `unofficial' free services to indigent clients.124
Foreign studies have indicated that the highest earning private
practitioners reported the lowest level of job satisfaction, while law
professors and public interest lawyers derived the most `psychic income'
from their work.125 This suggests, quite simply, that lawyers involved in
pro bono work are likely to be happier in their work than the `corporate
firm population'.126 Edwards notes that these statistics also suggest a link
between low `psychic income' (job satisfaction) and stress-related
120 See the News 24 website: <www.news24.com/News24/South_Africa/Gauteng/0,1113,2-7-
829_1240926,00.html>.
121 Ibid.
122 McQuoid-Mason (note 6 above) S-116-117.
123 Whittle (note 11 above) 14.
124 There is no statistical evidence of unofficial free legal aid, but it is often referred to, for
example in Whittle ibid 15.
125 K Edwards `Found! The Lost Lawyer' (2001) 1 Fordham LR 37, 55.
126 Ibid.
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diseases.127 Of course, it may well be that these differences in `psychic
income' and stress-related diseases have more to do with the reasons for
choosing to enter private practice or public interest work and the nature
of the work. Nevertheless, in a grossly unequal society like South Africa,
professionals who are required to assist in alleviating the plight of the
poor may draw a sense of patriotic contribution from their pro bono
work.
The programme might also assist in bridging the divide between the
attorneys' profession and NGOs. By requiring attorneys to render free
services through joint venture agreements between the (Cape) Law
Society and specific NGOs, the programme will establish formal links
between the organised legal profession and non-state actors. These links
may help to imbue the attorneys' profession with the sense of public
service that is characteristic of many of these NGOs.
(iv) Objections to compulsory pro bono for attorneys
The potential problems with a policy of compulsory pro bono will be
considered as general objections, using the Cape model as an example.
Afterwards, the Cape model itself will be evaluated, in the context of
South African conditions and on the basis of its specific requirements.
The commonly cited quality-control concern is that, without sufficient
supervision and regulation, the services rendered could degenerate into
`second-rate justice'.128 Given that indigent persons will often not be able
to demand better service, this is a real concern. Cousins notes that an
important means of ensuring quality service is regular and extensive
evaluation of a country's legal aid scheme.129 In France, a special
consultative board has been set up specifically for this purpose.130
Another concern is the possible unintended effect of setting a ceiling
rather than a floor. The Cape Law Society's model will require only two
hours a month of pro bono work. This is a fairly modest demand,
although not insignificant. The concern is, however, that lawyers will feel
that their moral obligation to assist indigent persons goes no further than
those two hours a month. In my view, the two hours a month should
rather be seen as a minimum. Two hours a month is almost certainly less
than the time required to litigate one civil case. If that is true, what is the
point of setting such an amount of time as mandatory?
It has also been contended that, for small firms and attorneys
struggling to establish themselves, unremunerated work can be unafford-
able. However, this point is contentious. In the survey on community
127 Ibid.
128 Whittle (note 11 above) 14.
129 M Cousins `Civil Legal Aid in France, Ireland, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom: A
Comparative Study' (1993) 12 Civil Justice Quarterly 154, 160.
130 Ibid.
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service conducted by the Cape Law Society, two completely divergent
points of view were reflected in responses. While one response read
`Young practitioners have less time as they are building practices',
another attorney said `Senior practitioners have bigger practices and less
time, thus younger practitioners must do more.'131
These comments are open to two interpretations: either both junior
and senior attorneys are generally short of time, or the comments simply
attempt to rationalise an unstated antipathy towards community service.
However, if all that is required is two hours a month, time pressure
cannot be a serious concern. The reluctance of attorneys to take pro bono
matters that is if pro bono is subjectively onerous even if they can afford
the time, is nevertheless a real concern.132 This also relates to the `quality
control' problem discussed above.
The two comments by senior and junior attorneys above also indicate
the difficulty of trying to accommodate the incommensurable differences
between different types of practice, large and small firms and attorneys of
varying experience. A uniform requirement of pro bono work seems,
therefore, the simplest and least controversial way to avoid such
minefields, especially if the required amount of service is not very
demanding.
A related objection to compulsory pro bono is the argument that the
burden of providing legal services should be carried by the whole society,
not the legal profession alone.133 On this view, legal aid is a government
responsibility, to be facilitated by taxation. However, in contrast to other
occupations, the practice of law carries with it an element of civil
responsibility, which means that the legal profession shares the
responsibility for ensuring that the law serves all persons.134
Another criticism relates to inefficient use of human resources. It is
argued that it is less than optimal to require a leading contract lawyer to
assist indigent divorce plaintiffs the contract lawyer's vast expertise will
be entirely wasted. However, as an argument against mandatory pro
bono work, this must fail for two reasons. First, attorneys may be given a
degree of choice in selecting the area of law in which to render pro bono
services and the contract expert can then assist with contractual
disputes.135 Secondly, the argument supports maintaining the status
quo in terms of which only the wealthy have access to civil justice.
Therefore, the moral argument based on equality and a substantive
131 Unpublished Community Service Questionnaire compiled by the Criminal Law, Legal Aid
and Community Service Sub-committee of the Cape Law Society from 28 February to 15
May 2002, para 4.
132 McQuoid-Mason (note 6 above) S-117.
133 Cardin and Rhudy (note 55 above) 12.
134 Ibid.
135 This choice is specifically provided for in the Cape Law Society's Draft rule 21 of the Cape
Law Society Rules, which provides a list of possible areas of pro bono service.
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understanding of `fairness' for making pro bono work compulsory
outweighs any potential utilitarian inefficiency.
A second aspect of the inefficiency concern is whether a firm is allowed
to assign a single attorney or candidate attorney to perform all its hours
of community service. At present, this appears impermissible, as the
Draft Joint Venture Agreement produced by the Cape Law Society must
be entered into by each individual attorney and the organisation through
which he/she intends to render service.136 There has been a similar
proposal that practitioners be permitted to `subcontract' community
service to a candidate attorney.137 Many large firms already have
dedicated attorneys and candidate attorneys who take on pro bono
matters.138 While there may be utilitarian advantages to such an
approach, the Cape model currently requires each individual attorney
to render community service personally.
In general, a programme of compulsory pro bono work is a defensible
and viable policy. However, some details of the Cape model warrant
particular attention and criticism.
(v) Conclusions: is the Cape model ideal?
While the Cape Law Society has led the way in making pro bono work
mandatory for its members, first is not necessarily best. While the Cape
attorneys should be praised for taking this first step, their model is not
immune from criticism.
First, the model seems to provide largely for what one might describe
as `indirect' pro bono, that is, for supervisory and advisory services at
university clinics, community advice offices and NGOs. While this type
of work must not be undervalued, it is likely that many attorneys will opt
for this avenue to fulfil their pro bono obligations. The Draft Joint
Venture Agreement produced by the Cape Law Society centres on the
provision of advice, which is not the primary need of university law
clinics.139 There is therefore unlikely to be any increase in availability of
`direct' legal services: legal representation and litigation. An increase in
such services could be achieved by requiring attorneys to take unpaid
matters on referral from the Legal Aid Board's justice centres and the
courts. However, this will require additional administrative machinery
and planning.
136 Draft Joint Venture Agreement, submitted with the Motion by the Council of the Cape Law
Society at the 2002 AGM.
137 See, for example, the unpublished Community Service Questionnaire (note 131 above)
numbered para 4.
138 `South Africa Pro Bono System in Public Interest' Business Day 12 September 2003. An
example is the firm Bowman Gilfillan Inc, which has a pro bono committee to manage its pro
bono work.
139 Letter to the Directors of University Law Clinics from W De Klerk, Secretary of the
Association of Universiy Legal Aid Institutions dated 2 June 2003 on the subject of `CLS Pro
Bono Scheme', para 7.
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Secondly, the two hours a month (24 hours a year) is fairly modest. A
cynic might wonder whether the Cape body wisely opted for this mild
self-imposed pro bono programme in anticipation of a harsher one being
forced upon attorneys by the government.140 The Advisory Council of
the Maryland Legal Services Corporation estimated that the average pro
bono case required approximately ten hours of legal work.141 Never-
theless, two hours a month is probably not sufficient time to take one
motor vehicle accident case to fruition within a year. Perhaps it would be
more appropriate to double the Cape's requirement to require 48 hours
per year and 4 hours per month.142 Indeed, in a survey of Cape attorneys
on the subject of community service, 52,5 per cent said that they would be
prepared to render 48 hours of community service per year, 12,5 per cent
were willing to render more than this amount, while 34,5 per cent
suggested less than 48 hours per year.143
Thirdly, the Cape draft rule 21 exempts attorneys with 40 or more
years of experience or who are over 60 years old from the programme.
There seems no rational reason to exempt what are essentially the upper
echelons of the profession from pro bono duties, and no reason was given
in the resolution. These attorneys, who are presumably still sufficiently
proficient to work for commercial firms, are a valuable resource of
experienced `personpower'.
Finally, the Cape Law Society scheme has not put in place mechanisms
to ensure quality control. In my view, an independent body should be set
up and charged with the task of evaluating pro bono services rendered in
terms of the scheme, including investigating complaints received. In
addition, effective sanctions need to be put in place to ensure compliance
with expected standards of professional service. The Cape Law Society's
existing disciplinary procedures may, however, be sufficient to deal with
situations of inadequate service.
It is therefore argued that in some respects the Cape model is not ideal
and some fine-tuning may prove necessary if the policy is nationalised or
other provinces follow suit. One of the major redeeming features of the
Cape programme is that, having been adopted voluntarily, it is likely to
be approached with greater motivation and goodwill than state-imposed
pro bono work would be.
140 Jeremy Sarkin argued at the `Pro Bono Conference' in Boksburg in May 2002 that attorneys
should use their opportunity to adopt a programme on their own terms, before the state
imposed one. Whittle (note 11 above) 13.
141 Cardin and Rhudy (note 55 above) 9. The pro bono programme in Maryland in the United
States of America in the 1990s provides a useful comparison, because of the similarity in the
scale of the attorneys' profession in Maryland and South Africa. In 1990, Maryland had 13
695 attorneys, while South Africa currently has about 14 000.
142 The specific proposal of 48 hours per year was made by Cheryl Loots in a `Discussion Paper
on the Transformation of the Legal Profession' prepared by the Policy Unit of the
Department of Justice and Constitutional Development 1999.
143 Unpublished Community Service Questionnaire (note 131 above), para 5.
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(b) Compulsory community service for law students and graduates
Two distinct proposals have been made and debated recently:144
(i) community service for LLB students as part of their curriculum; and
(ii) post-graduation community service.
The two proposals are not necessarily mutually exclusive, and might well
complement one another. They will, however, be considered separately.
In an article on legal education, Justice O'Regan argues that the primary
social responsibility of law schools is to produce competent graduates.145
But, as she acknowledges,146 law schools have another responsibility:
producing socially responsible law students, which, in my view, is equally
important.
(i) Community service for LLB students as part of their curriculum
Certainly, law clinic work would be at the core of any proposed
community service for law students. There are growing calls worldwide
for the introduction of `Clinical Legal Education' to supplement
traditional methods of teaching law students, namely the `lecture' and
`Socratic' methods.147 Rahman, speaking of the Bangladeshi experience,
describes such traditional methods of classroom teaching as an attempt
to convert the law into `a mere totality of norms applicable to certain
defined facts and situations', which overlooks `the social values of
law'.148 The advantages of a clinical legal education include the
development of graduates who are more `practical' and more `ethical',149
as well as meeting what is a dire national need for legal aid services.
In the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Development's 1999
Discussion Paper, Professor Loots proposed that law students should be
required to complete 200 hours of community service as part of the
curricular requirements of the LLB degree.150 The service could include
work at law clinics, advice offices and Street Law teaching.151
This proposal was initially included in early drafts of the Legal Practice
Bill. However, apparently after lobbying from the deans of law faculties,
144 Loots (note 142 above) 18.
145 O'Regan (note 84 above) 244.
146 Ibid 249.
147 J Asiema and L McKinney `The Clinical Programme of the Faculty of Law, University of
Nairobi: A Hybrid model' 2003 Discussion paper submitted for the First All-Africa Clinical
Legal Education Colloquium 23 to 27 June 2003, Durban, South Africa 18.
148 M Rahman `From Traditional to Rebellious to Developmental Lawyering: Tortuous Journey
of Clinical Legal Education in Bangladesh' 2003 Discussion paper submitted for the First
All-Africa Clinical Legal Education Colloquium 23 to 27 June 2003, Durban, South Africa 1.
149 Edwards (note 125 above) 38.
150 Loots (note 142 above) 18.
151 Ibid.
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it was removed. Nevertheless, many law schools have implemented
compulsory community service as a curricular requirement. For instance,
at the Universities of the Witwatersrand, Rhodes and North West,
participation in legal aid clinics takes the form of a compulsory final year
LLB course. This is not necessarily immediately achievable at all 21 law
schools because of lack of capacity to provide the necessary resources and
supervision.
The total AULAI Trust funding to university law clinics for 2004 was
R3 125 529, spread over 15 institutions,152 which comes to an average of
approximately R200 000 per institution. From this AULAI funding, the
salaries of 13 attorneys, 16 candidate attorneys, 13 paralegals/adminis-
trative staff are paid. However, clinics also receive funding from other
NGOs.153 In addition, justice centres have co-operation agreements with
a number of universities to assist specific groups.154 These additional
funders fund separate legal staff.
The number of students involved in these clinics varies from one
institution to the next. The total number of students involved in law
clinics in 2003 was about 1 500. Some institutions require 100 per cent of
final year students to participate,155 while at others the rate is below 20
per cent. Approximately 63 legal staff were employed to supervise these
students. Supervisor-student supervision ratios vary from 1:7 to 1:72.
Once a supervision ratio rises above 1:25, depending on case load and
other variables, it is problematic. Simply making clinic participation
compulsory without any sensitivity to supervision ratios will only lead to
poor legal services being rendered and students learning less than they
would if properly supervised.
If finally achieved, however, compulsory curricular legal aid would see
the almost 3 000 final year students at South Africa's law schools
rendering a valuable service, while also receiving the tangible benefit of a
practical legal education. In reference to clinical education at the
University of Zimbabwe, Guni states that students involved in the Legal
Aid Clinic `full time . . . have started on a better footing in private
152 Since the mergers of academic institutions, the number of universities in the country has
decreased, but some of these merged institutions now have two law faculties and
consequently two law clinics. The statistics in this paragraph and the paragraph below are
drawn from a document distributed at a meeting of the South African Law Deans
Association on 14 May 2004. I am grateful to Ms Bev Bird, the Acting Director of the
University of Cape Town Legal Aid Clinic for providing me with the statistics.
153 Other sources of funding include the Attorneys Fidelity Fund, Universities themselves,
Atlantic Philanthropies and the Rural Legal Trust.
154 See the Legal Aid Board Annual Report 2002/3, the back cover of which lists these co-
operation agreements.
155 In 2003, this was achieved at the University of Port Elizabeth, Rhodes University, University
of Venda, University of the North, Rand Afrikaans University and University of Zululand.
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practice and government service than their counterparts who did not
attend the Clinic'.156
Another target is the introduction of Student Practice Rules. These
rules would allow final year law students acting through university law
clinics to appear in magistrates' courts. Once a popular proposal, they
have never been promulgated.157 The concern is, of course, that sufficient
safeguards must be in place to prevent poor service by these students.
The Dean of the University of Cape Town's Faculty of Law has
recently proposed the introduction of a curricular community service
requirement for the LLB at that institution.158 In the case of legal aid
clinic and advice office work, such a policy is most valuable in the latter
years of the LLB degree. It would be irresponsible and counter-
productive to allow unqualified students to provide such services.
However, there are community-based projects that could be quite easily
undertaken by first and second year students, given sufficient supervision
and administrative support, for example Street Law teaching, which is
particularly effective at the University of KwaZulu-Natal.159 Students
travel to local schools, churches and other community fora to conduct
lessons or workshops on aspects of the law.
The introduction of a compulsory community service component into
the curriculum of the LLB degree nationally would create the human raw
materials for a number of projects. The policy could be shaped to cater
for students at different stages in the degree, for example by limiting law
clinic work to final year students with the requisite legal knowledge, while
allowing more junior students to participate in legal education projects
such as Street Law. Other work that could be undertaken includes
assisting in the running of the Small Claims Courts, domestic violence
counselling and work at advice offices, which does not require the
substantive knowledge of the law that law clinic work demands, and so
could be undertaken by students in lower years.
All these possible community service projects would contribute greatly
to the broad goal of access to civil justice. Increasing the number of
students involved in university law clinics would create greater capacity
to assist people with civil matters. Other projects, such as Street Law,
would help to foster a human rights culture and make people more aware
of their rights. More specialised projects, such as domestic violence
advice work, target specific areas of law, both criminal and civil, in which
156 V Guni `Understanding Clinical Legal Education with Special Reference to Zimbabwe' 2003
Discussion paper submitted for the First All-Africa Clinical Legal Education Colloquium 23
to 27 June 2003, Durban, South Africa 5.
157 McQuoid-Mason (note 6 above) fn 82.
158 Prof Hugh Corder, Dean of the Law Faculty of the University of Cape Town, announced this
proposal at a general meeting of UCT law students in April 2003.
159 McQuoid-Mason (note 6 above) S-140-141. The University of KwaZulu-Natal has for many
years required all final year LLB students to do a compulsory public interest law course
consisting of either law clinic or Street Law work.
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there is a need for assistance. Such a package of community service
nationally would have enormous benefits.
In the context of community service generally, two important potential
pitfalls need to be avoided: first, creating projects that attempt to render a
service without having sufficient supervision and administrative support
to guarantee quality; secondly, encroaching on an often ignored but also
scarce resource, namely student time.160 A community service pro-
gramme should not come at the expense of unrealistically increasing the
academic burden on students and thereby risking increased failure rates.
As such, any community service programme would need to be carefully
incorporated into current curricula.161
Discussing law clinic work specifically, as part of the broader proposal
of community service, Wilson identifies three possible obstacles to the
implementation of a `clinical programme' at a law school. First, there is
the ideological obstacle of conservative views as to the law school
classroom experience. Secondly, there are institutional limits in terms of
availability of funding and human resources. Finally, there are logistical
limits, such as availability of office space and accessibility of the
courts.162 If the first obstacle is overcome, and the profession is won over
to a Clinical Legal Education approach, institutional and logistical
obstacles, which differ across the institutions, need not be insurmoun-
table.
In terms of costs, an advantage of an intra-curricular community
service model is that it provides essentially free labour. The expenses
involved generally pertain to administrative costs for the universities
concerned. Indeed, rather than regarding the `resources argument' as an
obstacle to a community service programme, McQuoid-Mason notes:
What sets developing countries apart from developed countries is that law schools in the
former have a special duty to serve their communities. . . because they often operate as a
privileged island of resources in a sea of scarcity, particularly when it comes to providing
access to justice for the poor.163
Therefore, while universities may initially experience difficulties in
funding community service projects, particularly law clinics, they are in a
better position to bear this cost than the communities in which they are
located and which they should serve. When one combines this relative
160 `SPR Dialogue with D J McQuoid-Mason at the South Africa Law Teachers' Conference'
Unpublished interview with David McQuoid-Mason conducted by two Harvard law
students, Ryan Baker and Raj Goyle January 11 1999, Vista University, Bloemfontein.
161 O'Regan (note 84 above) 242.
162 R Wilson `Clinical Legal Education for Human Rights Advocates' 2003 Discussion paper
submitted for the First All-Africa Clinical Legal Education Colloquium 23 to 27 June 2003,
Durban, South Africa 2.
163 D McQuoid-Mason `Access to justice and the Role of Law Schools in Developing Countries:
the South African Experience' 2003 Discussion paper submitted for the First All-Africa
Clinical Legal Education Colloquium 23 to 27 June 2003, Durban, South Africa 46.
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privilege of law schools with a paradigm shift to regard Clinical Legal
Education as part of the core curriculum of a law degree, then university
law clinics must climb the ranks of internal funding priorities within
universities. Reallocating some working hours of existing academic staff
away from academic courses to clinic work would be one possible way of
addressing the heavy costs of clinical programmes resulting from the
intensive supervision required.
(ii) Post-graduation community service
Former Chief Justice Arthur Chaskalson is a proponent of compulsory
community service for law graduates.164 The graduates would be
registered as `legal interns' and would perform a certain period, perhaps
a year, of service in mainly state legal aid structures as a requirement for
entry into the profession. This would be similar to the period of
internship which medical graduates are currently required to undergo in
South Africa. Current competing drafts of the Legal Practice Bill
empower the Minister for Justice and Constitutional Development to
promulgate regulations to impose compulsory community service as a
requirement for entry into the legal profession.165 However, it is not clear
which version of the Bill will become law, or how (or even whether) the
Minister will exercise this regulation-making power.
Two main advantages of such a programme are cited: first, an obvious
increase in the available human resources for the provision of civil legal
aid, and second, the provision of an egalitarian across-the-board entry-
point into the legal profession. The second argument is the factual
observation that the current system of articles of clerkship constitutes a
barrier to access to the profession, particularly for previously disadvan-
taged students.166 While about 2 500 lawyers graduate annually, there are
fewer than 2 000 registered candidate attorneys (CAs).167 Given that
most CAs take articles of clerkship for two years, this means that
probably no more than 1 000 new posts are available each year for
approximately 2 500 incoming graduates. A compulsory, across-the-
board system of community service would provide an entry point into the
profession for all graduates. It should be noted, however, that not all law
graduates seek articles of clerkship, as many do not intend to practise as
attorneys. It might be necessary, therefore, to limit such a system to those
graduates who intend to practise.
Another `advantage' of a post-graduation programme is that it would
ensure that law graduates give back to the state, which heavily subsidises
164 A Chaskalson `Legal Interns Could Solve Legal Aid Problems' De Rebus (December 1997)
782.
165 See s 8 of the Law Society Proposal and s 30 of the Task Team Proposal.
166 McQuoid-Mason (note 6 above) S139.
167 O'Regan (note 84 above) 242.
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a legal education.168 If any simple justification were required for the
imposition of compulsory work on graduates, this is found in the fact of
state subsidies ultimately gleaned from the taxpayer.
This proposal met with much criticism from the attorneys' profession.
It was argued in an editorial in the profession's magazine De Rebus that
representation by such legal interns could be of such a poor standard that
it would almost be worse than no representation.169 It was argued further
that the legal aid system should not be used as a means of granting entry
into the profession to disadvantaged students, as that is not its
purpose.170
There is a genuine concern that unsupervised legal interns could
struggle to such an extent that both the clients and the interns would be
dissatisfied. In the medical internship programme, many interns have felt
as if they have been `thrown in at the deep end'. This would have to be
avoided to prevent internship picking up a negative stigma as chaotic and
frustrating for the interns and `second-rate justice' for their clients.
However, the introduction of justice centres provides a useful
framework within which to implement such a programme. As the Board
had established 58 urban and 27 satellite offices and 13 High Court units
by the end of 2004,171 combined with the existing 21 university clinics and
various pilot rural projects, well over 100 stations for the placement of
interns should be in place by 2005. This would mean placing about 20 of
the 2 500 graduates at each station. In reality, not all 2 500 would be
available, as some graduates do not seek to enter the mainstream
profession immediately. To reduce this number further, interns could be
placed at the offices of the Public Defender. Indeed, 390 of South Africa's
432 magistrates' courts have facilities where people can apply for legal
aid.172 The Department could sift these potential placement centres to
include only those where sufficient supervision is available. A further
possible placement is as a judge's clerk, researcher or associate at the
High Courts, Labour Courts, Supreme Court of Appeal and Constitu-
tional Court. These posts already exist, all that would be required would
be to recognise them as community service placements.
As McQuoid-Mason notes, the implementation of such a programme
will not be easy. The budgetary implications are huge. The salaries of the
2 500-odd interns, in order to be reasonable, would have to be in the
region of R3 000 per month, which would come to a total of about R90-
million per annum. Nevertheless, there may actually be indirect cost
benefits to increasing access to civil legal resources. Because lawyers are
generally inclined to settle matters out of court, civil suits in which one
168 Sarkin (note 10 above) 227.
169 Referred to, unreferenced, in McQuoid-Mason (note 6 above) S-139.
170 Ibid.
171 Legal Aid Board (note 5 above) 17 Table 1.
172 Legal Aid Board Business Plan (note 69 above) 20.
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party is unrepresented are more likely to go to court. As such, increasing
access to civil legal assistance may relieve some of the pressure on the
courts, which translates into reduced expenses for the state. However, this
indirect benefit is unlikely to offset fully the expense of introducing such
an internship programme, and the financial implications may currently
be prohibitive.
V CONCLUSION
At present, the South African courts are open to anyone, just like the Ritz
Hotel! The commercial industry simply does not serve the vast majority
of the population. There is good reason to `mourn the rise of materialism
in law firms and the dominance of intense theoretical abstraction in elite
law schools'.173 In a profession that claims to be the mechanism for the
delivery of social justice, such a position is not tenable in the long term.
Section 34 of the Constitution guarantees a fair civil trial. I argue that
this confers a right on civil litigants to free representation in at least some
civil matters, depending on the capacity of the litigant to represent him or
herself and the complexity and potential consequences of the litigation.
This imposes on the state an obligation to implement a comprehensive
plan to provide civil legal aid to those entitled to it. Resource constraints
may currently mean that its failure to provide civil legal aid to the extent
required by s 34 is a reasonable limitation of the s 34 right. Nevertheless,
the state might look to the legal profession to assist in meeting its
constitutional obligations.
Bengtsson observes that the South African government is unable to
operate in isolation from civil society and NGOs.174 While it is clear that
the state structures, particularly the Legal Aid Board, are currently
overwhelmed, in my view the responsibility for the provision of civil legal
aid lies somewhere other than at the feet of the various fragmented
NGOs. Although the NGOs make a valuable contribution to the
development of our jurisprudence, they are too limited to meet the
country's civil legal aid needs. Rather, the responsibility to assist the state
should fall squarely on the mainstream profession: attorneys, law
students and, by extension, universities, especially state universities.
Compulsory pro bono for attorneys has been hotly debated, and the
Cape Law Society has taken the lead, developing a model requiring
attorneys to provide two hours of service each month. While the Cape
model is not flawless, it offers a programme that can be tested and
modified and has the major advantage that it is a voluntary move.
The incorporation of compulsory community service into the LLB
degree would also greatly benefit both students and the broader
community. Compulsory law clinic work for final year students would
173 Edwards (note 125 above) 38.
174 Bengtsson (note 56 above) 27.
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be an important aspect of such a programme, but it could also involve
community education projects such as Street Law.
An internship programme upon graduation would also have a number
of benefits, providing a uniform bridge into the profession for graduates
and a vast human resource for the provision of legal aid. However, it may
currently be a prohibitively expensive project, and the necessary
infrastructure to provide so many internship placements may be lacking.
Some form of broad, institutionalised programme for the provision of
free civil legal services by lawyers and law students is necessary to redeem
the profession and the law as an institution, and allow constitutional
promises to materialise in the lives of the many. Otherwise, civil litigation
will remain not an instrument for but an obstacle to the pursuit of
substantive equality.
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